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Private genomic companies have become a popular trend in the last two decades by 
providing customers with information regarding their ancestry and health risks. However, the 
profiles received from these companies can also be uploaded to public databases for various 
purposes, including locating other family members. Both testing companies and public databases 
have private interests, and both are at risk of law enforcement intervention for the purpose of 
forensic familial searching. There is little federal legislation protecting the privacy of an 
individual’s genetic profile. Consequently, it has been up to federal agencies, state laws, and 
judicial precedents to prevent the misuse of genetic information in the modern age.  
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From 1979 to 1986, the Golden State Killer was linked to over 50 rapes and 12 murders 
in California (Kolata & Murphy, 2018). Over 30 years later in 2018, a deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) sample from one of the crime scenes was finally matched to Joseph James DeAngelo 
after being run through GEDmatch, a public DNA database created for locating biological family 
members in adoption situations (Mohr, 2019; Kolata & Murphy, 2018; Zhang, 2019). The search 
resulted in several partial matches that were the genetic equivalent of third cousins. From there, 
law enforcement constructed a family tree that was eventually narrowed down to DeAngelo 
(Kaiser, 2018; Kolata & Murphy, 2018). With the rise of private genomic testing companies such 
as 23andMe and Ancestry.com, there has been increased concern over genetic data privacy.  This 
includes how that data is used by law enforcement and other third parties, especially in regards to 
familial searching in the case of the former. In general, the risk posed by accessible genetic 
information is overexaggerated within its current applications. However, there is currently little 
legislation protecting individuals from current and future systematic abuses by genomic testing 
companies, third party databases, and law enforcement agencies. As such, the industry is largely 
controlled by individual company terms of service, limited bureaucratic agency intervention, and 
judicial precedent.  
The more closely related two individuals are, the more similar their genetic profile is. 
Individuals share half of their DNA with each parent, excepting paternal mutations, and the 
degree of genetic similarity between siblings varies around 65% (Maguire et al., 2014; Bieber et 
al., 2006). Conventionally, law enforcement agencies search for matches to unknown DNA 
samples through different levels of genetic databases, which form a hierarchy known as the 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). Local departments (such as cities or counties) have 
their own databases, which are combined with other local databases in a state-wide database. In 
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turn, state databases upload profiles to the National DNA Index System (NDIS) that is 
maintained by the FBI (Office, 2001). When law enforcement agencies do not get a direct match 
in database to the DNA profile in question, they are occasionally permitted to further investigate 
similar results in case those partial matches are family members to the sample source. This is 
referred to as familial searching (Haimes, 2006). From there, analysts are able to narrow down 
the potential relative results by constructing family trees using the available genetic information 
in combination with public records, obituaries, and social media profiles (Zhang, 2019).  
In recent years, familial searching has been heavily applied to cold cases. Samples that 
previously did not produce a match are run through databases again to search for family 
members. Due to social factors, many individuals who commit crimes have relatives who have 
committed crimes. Consequently, there is an increased likelihood that someone who committed a 
crime has a relative already in the database. Furthermore, family members tend to live relatively 
near one another, thus allowing law enforcement to narrow down the partial match results by 
geographic area (Maguire et al., 2014). Currently, the only states that permit familial searching at 
the state level are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Familial searching is currently not performed at a national level. It is 
important to note, however, that a partial match is a moderate stringency match that occurs 
incidentally as part of a routine DNA profile search, not strictly as an intentional search for 
family members. Therefore, partial matches may be found through the (Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS) incidentally in states that do not permit familial searching, as all state databases 
are still subject to partial matches (CODIS, 2016). 
Conventionally, familial searching is conducted using short tandem repeats (STRs) 
(Haimes, 2006). STRs are small DNA sequences only a few base pairs long that are repeated 
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head to tail a variable number of times. Individuals possess two copies of each locus, one from 
each parent, which may have different numbers of repeat units. These patterns become 
individualizing when analysts compare how many repeats there are at particular loci to determine 
if two DNA profiles came from same person. (Why, 2000). For familial searching, The Scientific 
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) Committee on Partial Matches 
recommends utilizing moderate stringency matching in conjunction with a likelihood ratio 
because moderate stringency alone is of little value. Here, moderate stringency refers to two 
profiles who match at least one allele at each locus. In contrast, high stringency matches are the 
same at each locus (Scientific, 2009). Using STRs, familial searching is only reliable for parent-
child or full sibling relationships. Distant relatives do not share enough alleles to associate any 
more strongly with an evidentiary sample than the random chance that a stranger happens to 
share those alleles (Ge et al., 2011a). In an experiment using the former 13 core CODIS loci 
examined at moderate-stringency, almost no parent-child relationships were falsely excluded 
(excepting the few situations where mutation was involved). Consequently, familial searching 
using STRs is very reliable for parent-child relationships. However, 76% of sibling relationships 
were incorrectly excluded, making familial searching difficult even among siblings (Ge et al., 
2011b). Therefore, moderate-stringency matching is of little probative value to distant relatives 
in casework, which is concurrent with SWGDAM guidelines (Ge et al., 2011b; Scientific, 2009)  
 While law enforcement agencies use STRs, most major genomic testing companies 
utilize single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) compared to the human reference genome (Raw, 
n.d.; Downloading, n.d.). A SNP occurs where there are different common nucleotide residues at 
a single point in the DNA among the population. There are approximately 10 million SNPs in 
human genome, although only about 1000 are currently measured. Labeled arbitrarily the A and 
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B alleles for the two different common residues, individuals may possess the genotypes AA, BB, 
or AB based on which alleles they inherit from parents. As a result, SNP commonalities can be 
used with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo modeling program to map the probability of an 
individual descending from different subpopulations. This information is utilized in genome 
wide association studies (GWAS) to determine linkages between SNP genotypes and disease 
susceptibility. However, there may be false associations when the two variables are both simply 
conserved within the ancestral line. Never the less, this ancestral information can be invaluable 
for exploring ancestry associations as researchers do not need to rely on potentially inaccurate 
self-reported ancestry information (LaFramboise, 2009). This technology thus forms the basis of 
the ancestry and health tests provided by private genomic companies.  
 SNPs have lower mutation rates than STRs at 10-8 to 10-9 mutations per site per 
generation compared to the 10-3 mutations per site per generation in STRs. Likewise, while a 
single STR can have several different alleles based on the number of repeat units in an allele, 
SNPs are limited to four nucleotide bases at each location. Consequently, many more SNPs are 
needed to be individualizing, which requires the coordination of many primer sets (Oldoni et al., 
2019, Sanchez et al., 2006). One experiment by Pakstis found that using 86 unlinked individual 
identification SNPs (IISNPs) resulted in match probabilities (the chances of finding two 
individuals with same genotype) of 10-31 to 10-35, which is a higher power of discrimination than 
the current STR 20 locus standard. However, researchers advocated that SNPs should be used as 
a complement to STR in situations of degradation rather than as a total replacement of the 
current system (Pakstis et al., 2010). Because SNPs are extremely small, they are impacted less 
by degradation as long as a sufficient number of SNP locations are tested. Additionally, because 
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SNPs do not use repeat units, they do not result in stutter peaks, which may be helpful for 
deconvoluting mixtures with a large major to minor contributor ratio (Oldoni et al., 2019).  
 Rather than retest biological evidence using SNPs, law enforcement agencies can 
compare one STR profile directly to an SNP profile. Consequently, evidentiary samples can be 
used to search directly against profiles produced by private genetic companies. Using the 
previous CODIS core 13 loci, researchers were able to identify 30-32% of parent-child 
relationships and 36% of sibling relationships, although this was a lower accuracy than finding 
an individual’s SNP profile through their own STR profile. The experiment was repeated later 
following the transition to 20 core CODIS loci, and the accuracy improved to identify 40-54% of 
parent-child and sibling relationships. However, researchers were optimistic that this statistic 
could be improved by reducing the initial threshold for partial matches and then narrowing the 
results by analyzing the partial profiles with other DNA tests and by constructing family trees, as 
was done in the Golden State Killer case. However, both methods raise ethical concerns 
regarding the privacy of families and the overrepresentation of certain groups in databases (Kim 
et al., 2018). 
 As of December 2019, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) contained 14,078,725 
offender profiles, 3,827,923 arrestee profiles, and 992,007 forensic profiles from casework for a 
total of 18,898,655 profiles. California, which was the largest contributor to the database, 
submitted 2,075,534 offender profiles, 822,802 arrestee profiles, and 110,365 forensic profiles 
for 3,008,701 total profiles, aiding in 83,937 investigations. There are approximately 330 million 
people in the United States (United, 2020). Therefore, in combination with CODIS statistics, 
only 5.5% of the U.S. population is represented in NDIS. Familial searching is more effective in 
areas where the DNA database size is large relative to the population, such as in the United 
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Kingdom (Williams & Johnson, 2005). Consequently, familial searching is not as practical for 
the United States in terms of population. Additionally, individualization is a concern not only 
from DNA but from personal information. 58.4% of the population of the US can be uniquely 
identified based on location, gender, and date of birth, although this number reduces dramatically 
the less information is available regarding birth date. Case in point, only 3.6% of the population 
can be identified from the above information if only the month and year are known, 0.04% if 
only the year is known, and 0.01% if the date is narrowed down to a 2-year age range. 
Consequently, this tactic is likely unhelpful for cases where police only have a general 
description of a suspect. As a result, the largest potential privacy threat comes from companies 
that have access to both your genetic and personal information, such as private genomics 
companies (Sweeney, 2000). 
There are four types of genomic testing: clinically meaningful, business, ancestry, and 
recreational. Clinically meaningful tests are performed with the intent to diagnose and predict 
information pertaining to a consumer’s health. The Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) 
supports this form of genomic testing under certain conditions. Business tests use a customer’s 
personal genetic information to sell products individualized to that particular consumer. Such 
tests do not meet AMP’s standards for “clinically meaningful” and are thus are not supported by 
AMP. Ancestry tests provide information regarding biological relationships between individuals 
but do not include health information. As a result, AMP remains neutral to these tests. Finally, 
recreational tests do not provide health information but include some genetic based differences, 
like food preferences. As these tests do not impact an individual’s health choices, AMP once 
again remains neutral (Association, 2019a). 
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23andMe was the first private genealogical company and remains a frontrunner in the 
industry. As of January 1, 2020, 23andMe collects registration information, self-reported data, 
and third-party data. Registration information includes a consumer’s name, date of birth, billing 
and shipping addresses, and contact information (including license number), which is more than 
enough information to identify an individual. Self-reported information is voluntary and includes 
phenotypes such as eye color, height, race, health information, and family history. If the 
consumer uses a third party website to connect to 23andMe, such as Google or Facebook, 
23andMe is able to collect data from that site, such as your profile picture, gender, username, 
age, language, country, and friends list, depending on the consumer’s privacy settings on that site 
(Privacy, 2020).  
Furthermore, 23andMe uses Google for some services, and Google is authorized to 
collect and use data, although the details of what information is collected remains unspecified by 
23andMe. Customers may opt out of Google data collection if they read the fine print of the 
terms on conditions, but that requires a thoroughness of research many consumers neglect to 
perform. Furthermore, some information is shared with other third parties, although 23andMe 
claims that this sharing is strictly opt-in for sensitive information, including genetic information, 
health information, some self-reported information. Likewise, consent is required for 23andMe 
to use consumer DNA in research, which includes genetic information and self-reported 
information that is de-identified and not linked to registration information when examined by 
external labs. However, this information can all be used at an individualizing level internally to 
23andMe for research (Privacy, 2020). 23andMe states they will not release individual-level 
personal information to third parties without asking for and receiving explicit consent from the 
customer, excepting court orders by law enforcement (Transparency, n.d.).  
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23andMe provides two kit services. Their Ancestry Service provides genealogical DNA 
results, but consumers can opt out of DNA relatives database. On the other hand, their Health + 
Ancestry Service provides ancestral data in addition to information regarding genetic health 
risks, gene carrier status, general wellness, and phenotypic trait reports. 23andMe does not have 
its own sequencing lab, but instead contracts an external lab for sample processing. 23andMe is 
required by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988 to provide the 
contracted lab with the sex and date of birth of samples, but no other information is provided, 
and samples are identified with barcodes (Guide, n.d.).  
Despite these protections, 23andMe may still be required to turn over genetic information 
to law enforcement if court ordered to do so. However, 23andMe states that it will notify the 
individual whose information is court ordered before giving any data to law enforcement unless 
doing so would violate the court order. This allows time for the individual to oppose the order 
before the information is provided. If the order requires the company not to inform the 
individual, the company will inform the individual after the order has run out. However, the 
company has discretion not to notify the individual if they believe doing so would pose a risk of 
death or serious injury. 23andMe clearly states that their services are not intended for forensic 
use. While their terms of service require that account information be accurate, they cannot 
enforce such a rule, so they do not possess the means to accurately provide information to law 
enforcement. Furthermore, they have no chain of custody and no guarantee that a customer sent 
in their own DNA, even though the company’s terms of service requires it. To that end, it is a 
violation of 23andMe’s terms of service for law enforcement to send in someone else’s DNA 
sample, and 23andMe will not process samples that were not collected using their own saliva kit 
(Guide, n.d.).  
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 In contrast to 23andMe’s detailed data protections and consumer safety focus, Veritas 
Genetics has fewer protections and is tailored towards consumer concerns regarding disease 
susceptibility. Their website claims that they sequence the entire genome and that 23andMe 
sequences less than 1% of the genome, but Veritas provides no sources to back up the later 
claim. Additionally, given that the SNP analysis does not require the use of the entire genome, 
the comparison itself is functionally irrelevant and appears to be a concealed attempt at 
manipulating public perception of both companies. Likewise, Veritas Genetics markets their kits 
on the basis of giving customers “the peace of mind that comes with knowing [they] did not find 
an increased risk for a specific condition” (Whole, n.d.). As a result of this fear mongering, 
Veritas Genetics justifies charging $599 to $3599 for its various packages, an astronomical 
increase compared to 23andMe’s $99 Ancestry kit and $199 Ancestry + Health kit (Whole, n.d.; 
23andMe, n.d.). Furthermore, within their General Data Protections Regulations (GDPR), 
Veritas asserts its right to hold on to consumer data for as long as they deem necessary within the 
purposes outlined in the GDPR. This includes both personal information (such as name, location, 
and genetic profile) as well as sensitive personal data (such as race, political opinion, religious 
beliefs, health data, and sexual orientation). The GDPR permits Veritas to disclose consumer 
data to third party processors like 23andMe does. However, the GDPR also allows data to be 
transferred internationally for third party usage, and that transferred data is subject to the 
(potentially lower) privacy regulations of the country it is sent to. Consequently, the majority of 
the protections afforded by United States government agencies like the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) are bypassed. Finally, while Veritas Genetics states that it does not sell or 
loan personal information to third parties, that clause does not outright prohibit the sharing of 
information under various other circumstances (Privacy, n.d.). Clearly, there is a great deal of 
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variation among private genomic companies, from the types of services they offer, how they 
market themselves, and to what degree they utilize consumer information. However, genetic 
information usage is not limited to testing companies themselves, nor are the testing companies 
the primary resource for law enforcement.  
GEDmatch is a database that allows individuals to upload their genomic reports obtained 
from third party testing companies, such as 23andMe or Ancestry.com. The website was 
originally designed to locate family members, particularly in cases of adoption. However, 
searching is limited to the profiles that have been directly uploaded to the database, so the 
individual being searched for (or an immediate family member) must have uploaded their own 
profile as well (Zhang, 2019). Because STR profiles can be tested for similarity against SNP 
profiles from private companies, law enforcement agencies are able to upload unknown DNA 
samples from crime scenes to search for matches as was done in the Golden State Killer case 
(Kim et al., 2018; Kolata & Murphy, 2018). Forensic familial searching was permitted on a 
limited basis by GEDmatch’s terms of service for cases concerning homicide and sexual assault. 
However, in May 2019 an exception was made to allow a search related to a violent assault case, 
which violated these terms of service. In response, there was a large amount of community 
backlash and GEDmatch changed its policy accordingly such that all users are now excluded by 
default from police searches unless they voluntarily opt in. As of October 2019, about 163,000 
users had opted in out of 1.3 million profiles. This has had serious repercussions for other 
agencies that utilized GEDmatch, including the DNA Doe Project, a nonprofit organization that 
used GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA to identify unidentified bodies. As a result, GEDmatch is 
veritably useless to law enforcement agencies within the terms of service set out by GEDmatch. 
However, there are still unethical ways to get around this restriction. Namely, law enforcement 
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agencies are still able to upload unknown evidentiary samples under fake personal profiles. 
While this a violation of GEDmatch’s terms of service, there is currently no method utilized to 
monitor and remove this kind of activity (Zhang, 2019). Furthermore, GEDmatch was purchased 
by Verogen, Inc. in December of 2019. Verogen is a forensic genomic company, so while the 
company currently intends to keep law enforcement searches on an opt in basis, future policy 
changes may sway information usage back in favor of law enforcement agencies (Mohr, 2019).  
Like GEDmatch, Family TreeDNA is a genealogy database that allows users to upload 
genetic profiles from third party companies. However, in August of 2018 the terms of service 
were updated to allow the database to partner directly with the FBI without notifying existing 
customers. CEO Bennett Greenspan has given conflicting stories while denying his involvement, 
but he personally approved FBI usage. Unlike GEDmatch, Family TreeDNA uses an opt out 
system, and as of October of 2019 only 2% of users had opted out. Furthermore, the company 
appears to be moving towards capitalizing on law-enforcement usage, raising their prices for law 
enforcement users from $100 to $700 per genetic profile uploaded (Zhang, 2019).  
Given the sensitive nature of genomic and personal data, it is unsurprising that such 
companies are under scrutiny by government agencies. On June 10th of 2010, 23andMe 
(amongst other genomic companies) was issued a cease and desist order by the FDA. According 
to the FDA, 23andMe’s genomic tests qualified as a Class III medical device under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). As such, the FDA argued that these tests posed a high 
enough risk of danger that they could not be allowed on the market without FDA approval 
(Wagner, 2019). 23andMe argued that their service guidelines stated that their tests were for 
research, informational, and educational use only, not medical (23andMe and the FDA, n.d.). 
However, the FDA was less concerned with the kits’ intended use than they were their actual use 
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by consumers. The FDA was apprehensive that consumers would use the genetic risk reports to 
make medical decisions without first speaking with a genetic counselor. This was particularly 
concerning as such medical conditions reflected in the risk reports may never actually develop as 
a result of environmental factors and lifestyle habits, and there is a degree of uncertainty 
regarding the accuracy of the tests to begin with (Maxmen, 2017).  
Consequently, 23andMe conceded and applied for FDA approval on July 30 of 2012, 
making it the first genomic service to seek FDA regulation. However, rather than approve 
23andMe’s request, the FDA sent a second cease and desist letter on November 22 of 2013 
(Wagner, 2019). 23andMe complied with the second order and only offered Ancestry kits until 
October of 2015 when they became the first (and only) private genotyping company to meet 
FDA standards for clinical and scientific validity. Since then, 23andMe has been authorized to 
provide genetic risk reports on select health conditions, such as Parkinson’s disease, late-onset 
Alzheimer’s disease, and BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants associated with cancer (23andMe and the 
FDA, n.d.).  
 On the law enforcement end, the United States Department of Justice issued an Interim 
Policy on Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching that went into effect on 
November 1 of 2019 (United, 2019). The document outlines restrictions on federally funded 
investigations that use third parties for Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA analysis (FGG), 
familial searching (United, 2019). Although state and local agencies lie outside its scope, the 
policy includes provisions on the use of both public genomics databases, such as GEDmatch or 
Family TreeDNA, and genetic genealogy companies, such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com 
(Zhang, 2019; United, 2019). The policy states that familial searching can only be used for 
violent crimes (or the attempt thereof) or for identifying remains that are suspected to be the 
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result of a homicide. Law enforcement agencies must first fail to produce a match from CODIS 
and exhaust all other reasonable leads before being permitted to search external databases, and 
the sample being searched must be from the presumed perpetrator or unidentified victim. The 
privacy of these parties is further protected in that the agency is prohibited from examining the 
genome for susceptibility to diseases, medical traits, or psychological traits. Most importantly, 
the interim policy prohibits the storage, upload, and searching of data from external genomic 
websites into CODIS, preventing the abuse of such databases and their users (United, 2019). 
Furthermore, a suspect cannot be arrested on the basis of this search alone; the law 
enforcement agency must perform an STR analysis of the suspect’s DNA and compare it to the 
unknown evidentiary sample prior to receiving an arrest warrant. If partial matches are found 
through the external database, law enforcement may request DNA samples from them but must 
receive consent unless asking consent would compromise the integrity of the investigation. In the 
latter case, investigators must consult and receive approval from the prosecutor and designated 
lab official, obtain a search warrant, and collect the DNA lawfully. If FGG does not lead to an 
arrest and criminal charges, law enforcement must destroy all third-party reference samples 
(including amplicons and extracts) and delete FGG profiles, account information, and data 
(United, 2019) 
 In June of 2019, the Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) issued their updated 
opinion on genetic testing companies to remain relevant to the current technological era. Their 
2007 statement supported genealogical testing only through health professionals, while their 
2015 statement supported private testing as long as it was clinically meaningful. Their 2019 
statement has maintained their 2015 stance with the added provision that they remain neutral to 
recreational and ancestral testing as they could serve educational purposes. Additionally, the 
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AMP maintained that any health claims should be clinically valid and such validation data 
should be provided to consumers with their individual reports. To ensure consumers were able to 
make competent decisions using test results, the AMP advocated that test results should be stated 
in terms understandable to laymen and include test limitations, how the results are significant to 
the consumer’s health, and how the results may impact the consumer’s family members. 
Likewise, they stated that the genomic testing company should be able to refer consumers to 
genetic counselors and encourage them to discuss relevant test results with a healthcare 
professional (Association, 2019b).  
 Despite these regulation and guidelines, some genomic companies are still liabilities. 
There has been discussion of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigating genomic testing 
companies for their handing and sharing of personal and genetic data with third parties. The FTC 
has declined to comment on the status or existence of such investigations (Baram, 2018). 
However, shortly after such rumors began, Ancestry.com and 23andMe updated their policies to 
be transparent with who consumer data is shared with, supporting the possibility of a federal 
investigation (Price, 2018). This would not be the first time the FTC has investigated companies 
that use genomic data, either. The FTC has previously filed charges against Genelink, Inc. and 
Foru International Corporation in 2014 for lax security and false advertising (in which 
companies unfoundedly claimed their products could cure certain health conditions), both of 
which are violations of the FTC Act (Wagner, 2014; FTC 2014).  
 Clearly, there are both strong benefits and concerns for the existence of genomic testing 
companies. Outside consumer interests, these testing services provide immense amounts of 
genomic data that can be used in research. A large number of genomes are needed to study 
complex genetic linkages, which is often impractical for research groups. Consequently, public 
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databases act as collaborative databases for secondary analyses (Erlich, 2014). Historically, 
many genetics studies use genome-wide association studies (GWAS), in which researchers start 
with a group of people with the same trait and then look for commonalities amongst gene 
variants. However, large databases from companies like 23andMe allow researchers to use 
phenome-wide association studies (PheWAS), in which researchers begin by looking at a gene 
targeted by a known drug and look for traits that are associate with variations of that gene. 
However, private companies also have external interests. In 2015, 23andMe hired Richard 
Scheller to lead in-house drug development and signed a deal with Genentech to allow them use 
23andMe’s data (Hayden, 2017).  
The use of genetic companies to further drug research can be viewed either positively or 
negatively. While the system aids research, there is no guarantee that the data will be helpful to 
the public at large if the company decides the resulting product is not profitable enough, or if the 
company charges an unreasonably high price for the product. Furthermore, genetic testing 
companies may still not be the best solution. Genes for Good uses a volunteer-based Facebook 
group to recruit individuals for genetic medical research. Participants take several surveys on 
their health history and are sent DNA collection kits in the mail (Hayden, 2015). As of 2019, the 
group had collected 27,000 DNA kits, exceeding their goal of 20,000 (Cell, 2019; Hayden, 
2015). This program also benefits volunteers by providing them with ancestry and DNA results. 
While the sample is skewed a bit towards younger females, it is largely representative of the 
population and has a broader demographic range than 23andMe, especially in regard to 
socioeconomic groups. Additionally, the program has signed a Certificate of Confidentiality with 
the National Institute of Health, agreeing that the collected data will not be used by government 
(Cell, 2019). 
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 Unfortunately, there are a variety of consequences behind genetic testing services that 
require scrutiny. As previously mentioned, there are security risks from both hacking and 
internal company use of genomic data. More than 80% of users opt in to share their data for 
research, although 23andMe gives users the option to independently opt in for academic and 
nonprofit research or for-profit drug companies. However, if an individual changes their mind, 
revoking consent does not guarantee that the data and physical samples actually get destroyed. 
Likewise, privacy statements are not static, so information that is currently protected may not be 
protected later. Additionally, as cited by the FDA, there are concerns that consumers may make 
dramatic health care decisions. Finally, there are a host of complications caused by law 
enforcement (Rosenbaum, 2018).  
 Companies de-identify genomes to protect the privacy of consumers, but samples 
can still be re-identified as needed to adhere to judicial subpoenas and warrants. 23andMe 
advocates that it will resist cooperation with law enforcement, and both 23andMe and 
Ancestry.com publish transparency reports regarding requests of them made by government 
agencies (Rosenbaum, 2018). As of October 15, 2019, 23andMe has received 7 requests from 
law enforcement for data from 10 different accounts, but no profiles have been distributed 
(Transparency, n.d.). Inherently, genetic companies have more to lose by cooperating with law 
enforcement than they do by opposing them, as the companies depend on consumer trust to stay 
in business. Consequently, 23andMe and Ancestry.com are likely to continue to fight law 
enforcement involvement (Rosenbaum, 2018).  
 These concerns have an understandable foundation, especially as law enforcement is 
liable to make mistakes when using familial searching. Even in the Golden State Killer case, 
GEDmatch identified 25 different potential family trees from the evidentiary sample provided by 
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police. Those results were narrowed down to two other main suspects besides DeAngelo, one of 
which was subject to a court-mandated DNA test prior to DeAngelo’s identification and arrest 
(Leavenworth, 2018). Similarly, Michael Usry Sr. submitted a voluntary DNA sample to the 
Sorenson Molecular Genetic Foundation as part of a church project. However, the group was 
later bought out by Ancestry.com. When police searched the Sorenson Y chromosome database 
for matches to a cold case evidentiary sample, they received a partial match at 34 out of 35 tested 
alleles. Law enforcement obtained a court order to reveal Usry’s name even though it was 
considered protected information in the database and proceeded to falsely accused Usry’s son of 
the crime (Mustian, 2015).  
 The Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit Court signed a warrant permitting Detective Michael 
Fields to search GEDmatch, including users that had opted out of being included in police 
searches. This in and of itself set a dangerous precedent that may spread to other jurisdictions or 
expand its scope to include testing companies directly (Jee, 2019). Prompted by the publicity of 
the Golden State Killer case, Fields revisited a cold homicide case from 2001. The GEDmatch 
search resulted in two cousins, who were then used to construct a family tree. Law enforcement 
visited the homes of family members requesting DNA that they claimed was to search for 
relatives to an unidentified body. Police later used this voluntarily submitted evidence to 
incriminate Benjamin Holms Jr (Schuppe, 2020).  
 Such blunders lead to a growing public distrust of both law enforcement and genetic 
companies, which can have serious repercussions for other groups. In particular, individuals may 
be reluctant to participate in research studies or non-profit organizations, such as the Jane Doe 
Project, due to privacy concerns (Erlich, 2014; Zhang, 2019). Furthermore, the use of genomic 
companies by law enforcement toes the line of the Fourth Amendment, which outlines a person’s 
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expectation of privacy and is cited in almost every DNA court precedent (U.S. Const. amend. 
IV).  
 The Fourth Amendment states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.,” 
and is thus often debated in cases of an individual’s right to privacy (U.S. Const. amend. IV). In 
United States v. Robinson in 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that a full search conducted when an 
individual was under lawful custodial arrest was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Additionally, the full search was not limited to outer clothing and was not contingent upon 
having probable cause that the search would result in something of interest. As a result, Robinson 
set the stage for later cases concerning DNA collection (United States v. Robinson, 1973).  
In Maryland v. King in 2013, the Supreme Court found that the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act did not violate of the Fourth Amendment because the state’s interests outweighed 
an individual’s right to privacy. The Maryland DNA Collection Act requires the collection of 
DNA evidence in cases of attempted or completed violent crimes or burglary. However, the 
DNA sample cannot be processed or added to any databases until the individual has been 
convicted. Similarly, the DNA evidence is destroyed if the charges brought against the individual 
are not supported by probable cause, if criminal action begins but the individual is not convicted, 
if the conviction is reversed and no new trial is allowed, or if the individual is pardoned 
unconditionally. As it stands, all fifty states require DNA to be collected from felons and 28 
states and the federal government have laws regarding taking DNA from arrestees, although 
there are some differences by state for which charges are testable upon arrest (Maryland v. King, 
2013).  
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The Maryland Court of Appeals had previously concluded that parts of the Act were 
unconstitutional in allowing DNA to be collected, arguing that King’s right to privacy was 
greater than the State’s priority of identifying him. However, the Supreme Court disagreed and 
stated that while a buccal swab (the most common method of collecting known DNA samples) 
was considered a search by law due to its intrusion of the human body, it was a minimal one as 
there was no “surgical intrusions beneath the skin” (Maryland v. King, 2013). Technically, 
warrantless searches and seizures are considered reasonable when they hold a strong public 
interest, as outlined Illinois v. McArthur. The State argued that if an individual was already in 
custody for a serious offense then the State already had probable cause. However, the Supreme 
Court has held in Wyoming v. Houghton that there is a need to balance State interests against 
individual privacy, and thus searches must be reasonable in both scope and execution (Maryland 
v. King, 2013).  
The Supreme Court had three primary justifications for their decision that the collection 
of DNA from arrestees was constitutional in King. First, they stated that DNA was crucial for 
identification purposes as individuals may use a fake name. Further supporting this stance, the 
Court pointed out that fingerprinting as a method of identification is considered natural upon 
arrest and is not considered a violation of 4th amendment as established in United States v. Kelly. 
Second, the Court argued that DNA would be important in determining if the arrestee was 
wanted for another offense. This information would provide law enforcement with the necessary 
knowledge to determine if the individual was a risk to the facility staff or other detainees, if the 
individual was a danger to society if they were released, and if the individual was likely to run 
prior to a trial to avoid the conviction of a previous crime, all of which impact the bail set on the 
arrestee for the current offense. Finally, the Court argued that collecting DNA from arrestees 
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may help exonerate a guilty individual if the actual perpetrator is found incidentally. Part of this 
decision noted that the CODIS core loci used in identifying individuals are noncoding and thus 
do not reveal information beyond identification. A provision of the Maryland Act requires that 
only DNA records regarding identification can be tested and stored. As a result, the Act itself 
helps protect future privacy interests by preventing the storage of phenotypic information, which 
could have negative ramifications such as racial profiling (Maryland v. King, 2013).  
While King set a standard for DNA collection laws, it is still heavily debated because the 
decision was made with a 5-4 majority, against which Justice Scalia wrote a heated dissent. He 
maintained that the real intent behind the DNA collection of arrestees was solving cold cases, not 
identification, as the arrestee profiles were run against unsolved cases, not just the conviction 
database. Previous standards, including City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, have held that 
suspicionless searches were allowed for certain reasons other than when the primary motivation 
was the detection of a crime. Furthermore, Scalia argued out that while fingerprints are taken for 
identification (which can lead to solving crimes), DNA is used to solve crimes and nothing else. 
However, this point is up for debate as the majority stated that the identification of an 
individual’s previous convictions is critical in deciding appropriate bail and other safety 
measures. Finally, Scalia had concerns that the King decision would encourage the expansion of 
DNA collection to arrests of nonviolent crimes (Maryland v. King, 2013). Regardless of the 
decision’s voting margin, King has been cited as a precedent in several other cases 
 The People of the State of California v. Mark Buza based their decision on the King 
standard but diverged from it due to differences between the Maryland Act and the California 
DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 being examined. The 
California Act had a broader scope and fewer protections than the Maryland Act, requiring the 
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collection of DNA from all felony arrestees without independent suspicion, a warrant, or a 
judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause. DNA was uploaded upon arrest and 
stayed in the database even if the individual was never charged or the case was dismissed. The 
arrestee could seek removal, but the process was not automatic and it was up to the arrestee to 
initiate the process. Even then, the request could be denied with no review (People v. Buza, 
2014). In California, a felony is any crime that carries a minimum jail or prison sentence of one 
year, including offenses as serious as murder to offenses as inconsequential as vandalism or the 
sale of controlled substances (Legal, n.d.). Consequently, the California Act affected a much 
larger group of individuals than the Maryland Act and required consideration outside of the King 
precedent (People v. Buza, 2014). 
Mark Buza was arrested without a warrant on felony charges, forced to submit a DNA 
sample before being formally charged, and threatened with a misdemeanor charge if he did not 
comply. The Appellate Court held that the DNA collection at the time of every felony arrest was 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case was sent to the California Supreme Court for 
review, but the Court remanded it back to the appellate court for reconsideration when the King 
case was decided. Upon the second review, the Appellate Court upheld their previous ruling that 
the California DNA Act was unconstitutional. The Court argued that because the California Act 
impacted people arrested for any felony before it could be decided if there was probable cause to 
do so and data was not removed if the person was not convicted, that the Act constituteed an 
unreasonable search and was a violation of privacy. Additionally, they built on Justice Scalia’s 
argument that DNA identification could be compared to fingerprint identification as DNA 
inherently contains significantly more information than fingerprints (People v. Buza, 2014).  
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Country of San Diego v. Michel Mason likewise refuted the King precedent to a degree. 
In response to a court-mandated paternity test, Mason argued that he had the right to request his 
DNA be tested in an independent lab rather than the state lab. The State had no issue with Mason 
submitting his DNA to the lab of his choice, but the State still wanted a sample for their own lab. 
The Court agreed with Scalia that DNA had a privacy interest even if it was only used for 
identification. Likewise, they support the Buza justification by stating that individuals have a 
privacy interest in their own DNA information because it contains information beyond 
identification, even if the DNA was obtained strictly for identification purposes. However, they 
went on to say that an individual’s privacy interest was not absolute if there was a compelling 
opposing interest. As such, the Court ruled that the State did not violate Mason’s right to 
personal privacy (County of San Diego v. Mason, 2012).  
 Mario W. v. Superior Court took a different approach and broke the DNA processing 
down into two separate searches. Arizona law requires juveniles to submit DNA samples for 
testing if they are charged with certain offenses. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court 
decision that the policy was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court 
later overturned the decision and remanded it to the Superior Court. The Arizona law allows 
DNA samples to be taken for identification, which was not the intent in the original case. The 
Superior Court divided the situation into two separate searches: the initial DNA swab taken and 
the analysis of the DNA. Previous standards hold that while some intrusions of the Fourth 
Amendment are justified, the State required greater justification for the second, more invasive 
search (Mario W. v. Superior Court, 2011).  
The State argued that if the juvenile was released prior to the trial without submitting a 
DNA sample and then did not show up for the trial that the State will have lost its chance to 
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obtain the DNA. Probable cause to take a DNA sample had not been determined for the two 
juveniles when their DNA was taken, but they were charged with serious crimes, which normally 
allows for fingerprinting prior to obtaining probable cause (Mario W. v. Superior Court, 2011). 
However, as discussed in Scalia’s dissent of King and in Buza, fingerprinting cannot be held on 
the same level as fingerprinting (Maryland v. King, 2013; People v. Buza, 2014). Consequently, 
while the Superior Court agreed that the first search to take a DNA sample was constitutional in 
case the juvenile failed to attend their trial of a serious crime, they ruled that the second search 
required greater justification in order to analyze the DNA before the juvenile’s trial. In particular, 
the DNA profile’s analysis and subsequent upload to a database was a higher invasion of privacy 
requiring probable cause, which was not present (Mario W. v. Superior Court, 2011).  
Although unrelated to the King decision, Carpenter v. United States is crucial to the 
discussion on familial searching in genomic databases because the Supreme Court held that 
information that is provided to third parties does not dismiss the individual’s privacy interests. 
Law enforcement had tracked a suspect’s cell phone to determine the individual’s location at the 
time of a crime. The State argued that there was no expectation of privacy because cell phone 
data is shared with a third party, the cell phone company. However, the Supreme Court argued 
that cell phone records constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The Court cited United States v 
Jones, in which the 5-justice majority argued that global positioning system (GPS) tracking had 
privacy concerns while the dissenting 4 justices argued that information voluntarily turned over 
to third parties had no expectation of privacy. Consequently, cell phone records held by cell 
phone companies were not considered voluntary exposure because cell phones are considered a 
necessity in the modern world and because cell phone data is sent automatically to companies, 
not voluntarily (Carpenter v. United States, 2018).  
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As applied to familial searching, identification is necessary to ascertain guilt prior to trial. 
Therefore, individuals found and charged through public databases would pass Mario’s 
precedent requiring identification to be the intention of DNA testing, making familial searching 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. While DNA has an inherent privacy interest, an 
individual’s right to privacy is reduced in the face of compelling State interests. Therefore, even 
under the Mason precedent, the Buza precedent, and Scalia’s King decent, familial searching 
would be considered constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, while Carpenter ruled 
that individuals had privacy expectations for information turned over to third parties, the decision 
emphasized that the distribution of this information was not voluntarily. As a result, individuals 
who submit their genetic information to third party databases such as GEDmatch may not have 
their expectation to privacy protected by this precedent.  
As has been illustrated, there is a vast amount of interplay between personal genomic 
companies’ private interests, the use of third-party databases, the use of these systems by law 
enforcement, and the decisions made by the judicial system. However, these trends suggest that 
the technology behind these groups is not as inherently problematic as the individuals using the 
systems for their own interests. 23andMe and similar genomic testing services provide ancestry 
and trait information to consumers, but the company has external interests in biotech companies 
and consumers are grossly uninformed about company policy and the significance of their own 
test results. GEDmatch was created for the altruistic purpose of locating family members, but it 
has been abused by law enforcement as an open-access database. Familial searching is a 
powerful tool that can be utilized to locate suspects through their relatives, but it can also 
implicate innocent individuals in casework.  
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The Golden State Killer case may not have been the first familial search to be conducted 
through public databases but it was certainly one of the most publicized, and as such it has 
become a symbol of what can be done using modern technology. A cold case several decades old 
was finally solved, even though the database also gave partial matches to several other 
individuals. The case against Joseph James DeAngelo has yet to go to trial, but the pretrial 
hearing is scheduled for May 12 (Canon, 2020). Conversely, in response to the plethora of 
complications associated with it, several states have placed restrictions on family searching. 
Maryland and the District of Columbia have banned it entirely. California, Colorado, Texas, and 
Virginia permit it only after all other leads have been exhausted (Jones, 2019). 
Private genetic testing companies and their use in familial searching is still extremely 
new, and legislation has yet to catch up to these advancements in technology to thoroughly 
regulate their usage. Until then, the FTC has issued a series of recommendations. First, they 
advise consumers to compare the privacy standards of each company before choosing one, which 
includes reading the terms and conditions. Second, they encourage users to consider their 
account options, which give them choices on how much of their data to make public. When in 
doubt, the FTC recommends individuals err on the protective side at first and loosen the 
restrictions as needed once they know the site operations better. Additionally, the FTC asks that 
consumers consider the privacy risks associated with providing personal information online, both 
from hacking and from unethical company usage. Finally, they ask that individuals report their 
concerns to FTC (Fair, 2017).  
At the moment, judicial precedent is the primary protection for consumers. These 
decisions protect many individuals from unwarranted searches, but they are not all-
encompassing, especially when faced with arguments of State interests. Additionally, all current 
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protections from terms and conditions to judicial precedents are subject to change, so individuals 
who are protected today may not be tomorrow. The regulation of these systems is and will 
continue to be in a state of fluidity until further legislation is passed protecting individuals from 
corporate and agency abuses. Consequently, while the usage of private genomic testing 
companies is not harmful in and of itself, consumers should consider the entire situation prior to 
submitting a sample, monitor the company for policy changes, and keep up to date on judicial 
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